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Dans cet article, on 6tudie la fagon dont les employeurs, les d6fenseurs des employeurs
et les gouvernements en Ontario ont propag6 le mythe d'une crise f'manci~re au sein
du r6seau d'indemnisation des travailleurs. On y documente comment les
pr6sentations trompeuses concernant l'6tat des finances de la Commission des acci-
dents du travail ont 6t6 utilis6es pour justifier des r6ductions dans les avantages des
travailleurs accident6s alors que des centaines de millions de dollars en revenus ont
6t6 remis aux employeurs ou n'ont simplement jamais 6t6 pergus.
I. INTRODUCTION: TRIUMPH OF THE CRISIS LOBBY
Every year, a predictable scenario is played out in several jurisdictions across North
America. Stories begin to appear in the media documenting the skyrocketing costs that
have thrown workers' compensation into crisis, creating a nightmare for hapless
employers. Experts appear on the scene to lay the blame on overly generous benefits
and abuse of the system by workers.
Workers' compensation "reform" becomes a hot item. The competitiveness of the state
or province in the global economy depends upon it. The result is a downward spiral
of worker entitlements as governments race to outdo each other at the chopping block.
The beneficiaries are employers, their lawyers and, in the United States, the private
providers of their insurance and medical services.
In Ontario, a small army of business lobbyists, lawyers and consultants has been
labouring for years to create the impression that the Workers' Compensation Board
(WCB) is out of control. They have alleged that the WCB's rising debt and increasing
assessment rates are symptoms of past irresponsibility on the part of politicians eager
to reap the immediate political rewards of increased benefits without considering the
long-term financial cost. The familiar prescription is to slash entitlements and hack
away at benefit levels.
* © Copyright 1998, David K. Wilken. The author is a staff lawyer with the Industrial Accident Vic-
tims Group of Ontario (I.A.V.G.O.), a community legal clinic located in Toronto. Earlier versions
of portions of this paper have appeared in The I.A. VG.O. Reporting Service.
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Successive Liberal and NDP governments attempted to appease this powerful lobby,
but to no avail. Bill 1621 overhauled the Workers' Compensation Act2 (hereinafter,
WCA) through the introduction of a dual award system in 1990, while Bill 1653 rolled
back billions of dollars in future inflation protection on January 1, 1995. Needless to
say, legal clinics and injured worker groups opposed these measures. But even these
massive cutbacks, though accompanied by no comparable sacrifices on the part of
employers, did not deter the lobbyists from their path - quite the contrary. One could
even characterize the "reform" process of the late 1 980s and early 1990s as a proving
ground for employer options. Not only did the whole experience whet the appetite of
employers for more cutbacks, it provided the impetus for them to develop detailed
proposals for legislative action that could serve as rallying points for employer
lobbying.
As an example, one may consider the bipartite process instituted by the NDP in the
early 1990s. The Premier's Labour Management Advisory Committee (PLMAC),
made up of business and union leaders, was given the task of reaching a consensus-
based workers' compensation reform package. In the end, however, the very nature of
the bargaining process between the two factions on the PLMAC, which was heavily
dependent on the participants' perceptions of what the government would or could
impose if no agreement was forthcoming, meant that the employers were able to use
the process as a stepping stone. At the end of the day, the diminishing fortunes of the
NDP government allowed the employers on the committee to achieve a final legislative
product containing substantial cutbacks, while every other employer in the province
was free to attack the government for half-measures in cost-cutting and overly
generous concessions to injured workers. Both opposition parties took up the call and
promised further cutbacks if elected.4 Meanwhile, the dissident unions, injured worker
groups and legal clinics who had opposed the legislative package in whole or part
could only hope for a positive response from the Royal Commission created to
examine all aspects of the system.5
It is by now trite to point out that the Progressive Conservative government of Mike
Harris which took office in the Summer of 1995 pursues a strategy of "creating a useful
1. Bill 162, An Act to amend the Workers' Compensation Act, 2nd Sess., 34 Leg. Ont. 1989.
2. R.S.O. 1990, c. W-11.
3. Bill 165, An Act to Amend the Workers' Compensation Act and the Occupational health and Safety
Act, 3 Sess., 35th Leg. Ont., 1994.
4. Ontario Progressive Conservative Party, Workers' Compensation: Common Sense. For a Change
(Toronto, 1995). S. Mahoney, Back to the Future: The Report of the WCB Outreach Tour (Toronto:
Ontario Liberal Party, 1994).
5. P. Biggin et al., "Justice for Injured Workers: The Struggle Continues" (1995) 11 J.L & Social
Policy 41, is adapted from a presentation delivered to the Ontario Royal Commission on Workers'
Compensation in the Summer of 1995 by the Toronto Injured Workers' Advocacy Group and the
Union of Injured Workers. The breadth of its contents is indicative of the Royal Commission's terms
of reference, which are discussed in E.Lipes, The LA. V.G.O. Reporting Service Newsletter 7:5 (2
December 1994).
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crisis" as a prelude to action. In the case of workers' compensation, the crisis lobby
had been laying the groundwork for years. The government was able to begin acting
within months of taking office by eliminating the Royal Commission, which it viewed
as "high profile, high cost", and replacing it with a "more focused, time limited review
process."'6 In place of the Commission, Mr. Harris appointed Progressive Conservative
MPP Cam Jackson as Minister Without Portfolio Responsible for Workers' Compen-
sation Reform.
The process of change did not stand still while Mr. Jackson completed his review. In
November 1995, Minister of Labour Elizabeth Witmer fired the WCB's bipartite
Board of Directors and introduced Bill 157 which confirmed the change in the Board's
governance. 8 It also set out to "strengthen anti-fraud measures and eliminate abuses
of the system." 9 The measures designed to reach these goals included the creation of
a number of new provincial offences and the strengthening of collection procedures
for overpayments of benefits to injured workers. 10 The rationale for these steps would
become familiar:
We are acting now because the [B]oard is on the brink of a financial crisis.... The
unfunded liability calls into question the long-term financial viability of the [B]oard
and its ability to provide future benefits to injured workers....
On top of that, Ontario employers already pay the second-highest premiums for
workers' compensation in Canada. These excessive rates are a major barrier to job
creation, new investment and growth in the province. 11
These themes were repeated in January 1996, when Mr. Jackson issued a discussion
paper entitled New Directions For Workers' Compensation Reforml2 (hereinafter,
Discussion Paper), which outlined a number of options for cutting entitlements and
6. Ontario, Report of The Honourable Cam Jackson, Minister Without Portfolio Responsible for
Workers' Compensation Reform: New Directions For Workers' Compensation Reform (June 1996)
at 3 [hereinafter New Directions Report]. The New Directions Report provides a brief history of the
"reform" process up to its publication at pages 3 and 4. See also T. Hyland, "The International
Labour Organization and the Workers' Compensation Reform Act: Conflict between International
Responsibility for Human Rights and Divided jurisdiction" (1998) 13 J.L & Social Policy.
7. Bill 15, Workers' Compensation and Occupational Safety Amendment Act, 1995, 1? Sess., 36"h Leg.
Ont., 1995.
8. On the day Bill 15 was introduced, the Minister announced that the President of the Board would be
allowed to rule by decree until a new Board of Directors was established. Ontario, Legislative As-
sembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), No. 20 at 598 (1 November 1995). This arrangement
was retroactively raised to legality by virtue of s. 6 of the Bill.
9. Ibid.
10. For an overview of Bill 15, see D. Wilken, "Bill 15: The Tory 'Reform' Process - Act I" (December
1995) 10:1 The I.A.V.G.O. Reporting Service 1.
11. Supra, note 8 at 597.
12. Ontario, The Honourable Cam Jackson, Minister Without Portfolio Responsible for Workers' Com-
pensation Reform, New Directions For Workers' Compensation Reform: A Discussion Paper
(January 1996) [hereinafter Discussion Paper].
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lowering the level of benefits for injured workers. The release of the Discussion Paper
was followed by an opportunity for submissions and a series of closed-door meetings
with interested parties, now known as "stakeholders", in February and March, 1996.
The public component of this process did not consist of public hearings, but amounted
to a presentation on behalf of the government by hand-picked experts from around the
world. The International Forum on Workers' Compensation, Health and Safety was
held in March, 1996. According to Mr. Jackson:
Participants learned that workers' compensation reform has been occurring around
the world and that Ontario is lagging behind international reform trends. Speakers
and participants expressed strong support for the analysis and the goals articulated
in Minister Jackson's Discussion Paper. 13
This "discussion" was followed by Mr. Jackson's New Directions Report14 in June
1996. The government's major legislative package, Bill 99,15 was introduced in
November 1996 and contained significant revisions to Mr. Jackson's recommenda-
tions. The Bill itself then went through a process of public hearings and numerous
amendments, passing final reading and receiving Royal Assent in early November
1997. By the end of this two year process, there was considerable room for confusion
over which proposals had actually been enacted.
16
It is no exaggeration to characterize Bill 99 as an attempt to place the workers'
compensation system on new foundations. It replaced the WCA with the new
Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997 [hereinafter, WSIA], which came into force
on January 1, 1998. The change in name also affects the Board, which has become the
Workplace Safety and Insurance Board (WSIB), 17 as well as the Appeals Tribunal
(now the WSIAT). The WSIA also introduces a new purpose clause which moves
compensation for injured workers from first to last place in order of importance and
even removes the qualification that such compensation should be "fair".18 Among the
more important substantive changes, it creates time limits for claims and appeals,
reduces the rate of compensation from 90% to 85% of net average earnings, eliminates
entitlement for chronic stress, allows for limits to be placed on benefits for chronic
pain by regulation, and replaces the concept of vocational rehabilitation with that of
"labour market re-entry".
13. New Directions Report at 6.
14. Supra, note 6.
15. Bill 99, An Act to secure the financial stability of the compensation system for injured workers, to
promote the prevention of injury and disease in Ontario workplaces and to review the Workers'
Compensation Act and make related amendments to other Acts, V Sess., 36 th Leg. Ont., 1996.
16. For a discussion of Mr. Jackson's recommendations and a comparison with the contents of Bill 99,
see Hyland, supra, note 6, which also discusses a Cabinet Submission which was leaked during the
period between the New Directions Report and Bill 99.
17. For the sake of clarity, this paper will continue to refer to "the WCB" or simply "the Board".
18. Compare WCA, s.0.1 with WSIA, s.1.
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The change with the largest financial impact is the further cut in the inflation indexing
of benefits for permanently disabled workers. Not only does this cutback affect
workers injured before 1998, it will for the first time subject tens of thousands of
workers who had previously been exempt to benefit de-indexing. 19 These radical
changes have been justified by portraying the WCB as financially "out of control",
suffering from a rising unfunded liability and imposing uncompetitive assessment
rates on employers.
The realities of the situation are more complex and less flattering to the business
community and government. In fact, thanks to the bitter medicine already forced on
injured workers, even the phony financial crisis that served as the crisis lobby's
rallying cry in the past had been solved before the present government's overhaul of
the system was completed. This paper seeks to illustrate that point by demonstrating
the following:
- The system never was in financial crisis. It was designed to have a large un-
funded liability, and this is still a good idea, validated as sound public policy
by politically independent examinations of the issue.
- Even if the unfunded liability could properly have been viewed as a crisis, it
was already in decline prior to the government's attack on injured workers'
benefits. By that time, the WCB had a higher funding ratio than in 1984, and
even the projections used by the government to show a worsening situation
demonstrate that the Board's funding ratio would have continued to improve
without further cutbacks.
- The present amount of the unfunded liability is overstated by billions of dol-
lars due to outdated assumptions.
- Despite published assessment rates, workers' compensation costs were al-
ready at their lowest level since the mid-1980s even before the government
gave employers a 5% reduction in assessment rates in accordance with its
Common Sense Revolution promises.
20
- Employers stripped more than $1 billion in assets out of the WCB's invest-
ment portfolio in the first half of this decade - at the same time they were
declaring the WCB to be insolvent!
- Ontario's workers' compensation costs were competitive with its largest com-
petitors in Canada and the U.S. before the "reform" process began.
These issues have not been rendered moot by the passage of Bill 99. Understanding
how the government and the crisis lobby have successfully misrepresented the Board's
financial situation in the past serves several useful functions. First, it lessens the
chances that those otherwise well-disposed towards injured workers will be dazzled
19. The details of this change are discussed in Section II below.
20. Ontario Progressive Conservative Party, supra, note 4.
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into accepting unnecessary cost-cutting measures in the name of future non-existent
crises.21 Second, it clarifies the potential public relations pitfalls that future pro-
worker reform efforts should avoid. And finally, it will assist in understanding the
immediate future, as the Progressive Conservative government attempts to further the
goals of its constituency by "spinning" financial news in its favour.
II. THE UNFUNDED LIABILITY: A PAPER TIGER
The first line of attack against injured workers has been the unfunded liability.
According to the crisis lobby, the WCB
is $11-billion in the hole largely because generous politicians, over the past decade,
kept improving the benefits paid to injured workers retroactively but ignored the
matter of how to pay for them. ... A private insurer forced into this situation would
soon be bankrupt.22
In 1993, business members of the Premier's Labour Management Advisory Committee
(PLMAC) formed by Bob Rae's NDP government even claimed that "[t]he system is
already technically bankrupt. '23
The legislative package recommended by the entire PLMAC and enacted by the NDP
government in 1994 sought to restore the Board's financial viability primarily through
an attack on the inflation indexing of the benefits paid to permanently disabled injured
workers. This is clearly the plum that the employers were after all along, since the
introduction of automatic annual indexing in accordance with the Consumer Price
Index (CPI) by a Progressive Conservative government in 1985 was the prime example
of a benefit improvement which applied retrospectively (not retroactively) to all
injured workers.
The so-called Friedland formula for inflation indexing contained in the NDP's Bill
165 replaced full indexing in accordance with the Consumer Price Index with the
formula (3/4 X CPI) - 1.24 The expected long-term effects were quite striking. A 35
21. In this context, it should be remembered that until the Bill 165 hearings in 1994, worker advocates
had not offered a sustained critique of the crisis rhetoric around the unfunded liability. At that time,
Michael Webster produced a paper entitled The Ontario W.C.B. 's Unfunded Liability: Myths and
Realities (Toronto: 1994), which formed part of the submissions to the Standing Committee on
Resources Development by the Toronto Injured Workers' Advocacy Group and the Union of Injured
Workers. The shift in focus from the question of whether workers or employers should pay the price
for the unfunded liability to questioning the meaning of the unfunded liability itself marked a real
turning point.
22. C. Mahood, "A poor prognosis for Ontario's WCB", The Globe and Mail, (8 November 1993) B1.
23. Supra, note 21 at 1.
24. WCA, s. 148. Both this indexing formula and the modified version contained in the WSIA, s. 49 place
a ceiling of 4% and a floor of 0% on the annual adjustment to workers' benefits. However, neither
contains a rollover provision to make up for inflation above the ceiling in later years of lower infla-
tion. The name "Friedland formula" refers to a Task Force on private retirement pensions chaired by
Professor Martin Friedland of the University of Toronto Faculty of Law. In that context, the formula
was put forward as an alternative to the lack of inflation indexing in many pension plans. The authors
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year old injured worker would watch the purchasing power of his or her WCB benefits
cut nearly in half by age 65.25 When the PC government came to power, no one could
seriously argue that injured workers had not "shared the pain" of hard times. The
sacrifices demanded of them at the altar of the unfunded liability had been both
extreme and enshrined in legislation. What able-bodied worker, public or private
sector, has been the subject of legislation mandating a 2% annual reduction in real pay
in perpetuity? 26
Yet the responsible Ministers and the crisis lobby continued to claim that further
drastic cuts were immediately necessary. If they were not made, employer assessment
rates would continue to grow, creating unfairness for future employers who would be
forced to bear the cost of past accidents. Most audaciously, the suggestion continued
to be made that future payments to injured workers would not be secure unless the
unfunded liability was dealt with immediately.
The most drastic of the Bill 99 cutbacks which followed was a further reduction in
benefit indexing through application of the formula (1/2 X CPI) - 1.27 Under this new
formula, the result is an annual reduction in real pay of 3% in perpetuity. The benefits
of our hypothetical 35 year old injured worker are now expected to lose nearly 60%
of their purchasing power by age 65.28 This "modified Friedland formula" which came
into effect on January 1, 1998 will apply to all injured workers except those with 100%
permanent disability pensions (injuries before 1990) or 100% future economic loss
awards (injuries after 1989).29 In addition to this small group, 30 the NDP scheme had
exempted tens of thousands of mostly unemployed workers injured before 1990 and
clearly took into consideration the fact that the relatively short life expectancy after retirement would
limit the erosion of benefits. They also set a higher benefit adjustment cap of 6.5% (via a 10% cap on
the annual CPI increase), but with a rollover. Ontario, Report of the Task Force on Inflation Protec-
tion for Employment Pension Plans (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1988) at 263 (Chair: M. Friedland).
25. This estimate is based on the WCB's standard actuarial assumption that inflation will average 4% in
the long run. Over 30 years, the Friedland formula for inflation indexing introduced in January 1995,
would decrease purchasing power by 44%.
26. This is exactly what the partial de-indexation of long-term benefits means. Application of the formula (3/4
X CPI) - 1 results in only a 2% adjustment to injured workers' benefits when inflation is 4%.
27. WSIA, s. 49.
28. Using the Board's standard actuarial assumption that inflation will average 4% in the long run, the
modified Friedland formula introduced in January 1998 is projected to decrease purchasing power by
58% over 30 years. Application of the modified formula results in only a 1% adjustment to worker
benefits when inflation is 4%.
29. WSJA, s. 50.
30. For example, 100% future economic loss (FEL) awards represented only 10.3% of the awards made
during the first 11 months of 1997, up from 8.8% in 1996. Interestingly, the total number of FEL
awards made in the first eleven months of 1997 represents only slightly more than half of the awards
made during 1996, 1,826 as opposed to 3,540. This may at least partially explain the apparent rise in
100% awards. Ontario Workers' Compensation Board, Monthly Monitor (December 1997) at 11.
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eligible for pension supplements. 31 Their benefits have gone straight from full index-
ing to the modified Friedland formula with the passage of Bill 99.
While it should not distract us from the fact that the NDP scheme was itself an
unjustifiable attack on the permanently disabled, 32 the inclusion of the supplement
recipients under the modified Friedland regime results in an enormous cutback.
Actuarial projections contained in the New Directions Report indicated that the
changes to the benefit indexation formula and de-indexing of supplement recipients
alone would account for 62% of the operational savings from its proposed reforms
within the first year, as well as 61% of the reduction in the unfunded liability expected
by the year 2014.33 This cutback is directly targeted at injured workers who suffer
from permanent disabilities, and nearly every other aspect of the so-called reforms
will have a disproportionate impact on them.
Can this draconian approach to the permanently disabled be justified by the Board's
"funding crisis"? The answer is no. The fact of the matter is that it is perfectly
responsible for the Board to carry a significant unfunded liability so long as it has
sufficient reserves to meet its future obligations as they come due.
31. The supplements are paid under s. 147(4) of the WCA for wage losses over and above the pension
amount. As of November 1997, the number of recipients stood at 29,373. Ibid., at 18. Another ele-
ment of the NDP's Bill 165 effectively raised the cap on these supplements (set at an amount equal
to the federal Old Age Security pension) by allowing for the payment of an "additional $200" under
s. 147(14) of the WCA. The exemption from partial de-indexing was attached to the additional $200,
rather than the s.147(4) supplement itself. This was important because the additional $200 is also
payable to workers who would be eligible for the s.147(4) supplement but are excluded because they
are eligible for OAS payments. The number of workers failing into this category is not regularly
reported by the Board.
32. See. for example, D. Wilken, "Does de-indexing violate the Charter?" (December 1994) 9:1 The
LA. V.G.O. Reporting Service 7.
33. New Directions Report at 52. This represents $219 million out of $353.2 million in operational
savings during the first year of implementation, and $9.3 billion out of $15.2 billion in savings on the
unfunded liability by 2014. These figures should be approached with some care. First of all, the final
version of Bill 99 which became the WSIA did not exactly replicate the report's recommendations.
Secondly, the first operational savings were predicted to occur in 1997, a year before the WSIA came
into effect, and to save the Board from an operational deficit of $295.6 million. In fact, it seems like-
ly that the Board will have an operating surplus in the hundreds of millions of dollars for 1997. See,
for example, Ontario Workers' Compensation Board, 1997 First Quarter Report (18 June 1997) at 4
which reports net income from operations of $84 million during the first three months of the year.
This compares with income of $22 million at the same point in 1996, a year which the Board
finished with a total net income of $432 million. Ontario Workers' Compensation Board, 1996 An-
nual Report at 9 [hereinafter, WCB Annual Report followed by the year of the report]. As of January
1, 1998, no financial information has been released by the Board since the 1997 First Quarter
Report, no doubt because it would have contradicted the government's crisis discourse during the
public hearings and legislative debate around Bill 99. Third, the available financial data also
demonstrate that the government's projections of where the unfunded liability was headed without
further legislative action were overly pessimistic. This is discussed in Section III below. Neverthe-
less, the enormity of the cut in terms of its sheer size should not be underestimated, while its impor-
tance relative to the rest of Bill 99 is probably still more or less accurately represented by the
percentage figures cited in the text above.
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A. The Unfunded Liability is Not a Debt.
The crisis lobby's main line of attack has been that the WCB was somehow financially
insolvent. Many members of the general public have no doubt drawn the conclusion
that taxpayers are responsible for this debt. The political resonance of this approach
in the present era of deficit-cutting and fiscal restraint is hardly surprising. What is
surprising is that the insolvency assertion has formed the backdrop to numerous stories
in the popular media and even to government legislation despite the fact that it is
patently false. Even if the WCB were in debt, the responsibility for payment would
rest with the employers of Ontario rather than the public purse. But in reality, the WCB
is not and has never been in debt. In fact, it had over $6.8 billion in assets at the
beginning of 1995, when the NDP's Bill 165 came into force. Since that time, its assets
have grown to $7.9 billion by the end of 1996 and will continue to grow. 34
The unfunded liability is the net difference between present assets and the capitalized
value of all future payments that the WCB estimates it will make to or on behalf of
workers who have been injured to date. This includes payments that will not be made
for over 50 years. If all of these payments had been payable at the end of 1996, there
would have been a shortfall of a little less than $10.5 billion.
Statements to the effect that the WCB was "technically bankrupt" are intellectually
bankrupt. Technically or otherwise, a person or company goes bankrupt when it cannot
pay its debts as they come due. The WCB has never failed to pay its debts, either to injured
workers or to external service providers. The fact of the matter is that it is impossible for
the WCB's estimated future liabilities to all come due in any given year. Some of the
payments are for medical or other services that will not be rendered for years, while most
wage loss benefits to injured workers must by law be paid in periodic instalments.
So what does the unfunded liability mean? A good model for thinking about it is the
system of Registered Retirement Savings Plans (RRSPs) and Registered Retirement
Income Funds (RRIFs) that many Canadians use to save for their retirement. Suppose
that you are 65 years old and wish to supplement your other income with $2,000 per
month from your personal plan. At age 65, you must have about $300,000 invested in
your RRSP to cover your retirement. If that amount is rolled over into an RRIF with
an 8% annual return, it will provide you with a payment of $2070 per month from age
65 to age 100.
Similarly, if the WCB was going to retire tomorrow, 35 it would need about $18.3 billion
invested at an annual rate of return equal to 3% over the rate of inflation. According
34. WCB Annual Report 1996 at 15. Note that this is so despite the conservative manner in which the
Board values its investments. The latter constituted about $7.1 billion of the Board's reported assets
at the end of 1996. However, this "carrying value" may be contrasted with an actual market value of
$8.6 billion at that same point in time. Since realized gains and losses in the Board's equity portfolio
are deferred and amortized over a five-year period, part of the difference between the market and car-
rying values may already have been realized. Ibid. at 18 and 19.
35. The figures used in this paragraph are current as of December 31, 1996. WCB Annual Report 1996 at
15. This is the last date for which audited figures are available and nearly the last date for which any
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to the Board's actuarial projections, this would allow it to continue paying the
pensions, medical care and other benefits for all of the workers who have already been
injured. Since it "only" has about $7.9 billion, its unfunded liability is nearly $10.5
billion (at the end of 1996).
If you were retiring at age 65 with only $129,000 instead of $300,000 to put in your
RRIF, then you would have about the same ratio of assets to estimated future liabilities
as the WCB (a little less than 43% at the end of 1996). Unlike the Board, you would
be facing bankruptcy in a few years. Your only choice would be to either re-enter the
workforce or cut your expenses. Since you would be unlikely to find a job at that age,
the wisest course definitely would be to fully fund your retirement.
This would also be the prudent course for private insurance companies. They are
required to fully fund their estimated future liabilities because, like a worker in his or
her 70s, they cannot guarantee a future stream of income from other sources. Unlike
the WCB, private insurers could be "retired" at any time by the competitive market
for premium dollars. If they relied on premiums from future customers to meet
indemnity payments to their current policyholders, these companies would be nothing
more than pyramid schemes that could collapse due to losses in their share of the
insurance market.
The Board, however, does not face these difficulties, because it is not about to retire.
As a monopoly insurer, it does have a guarantee of future income unless and until it
is "retired" by the legislature.36 Its RRSP only needs to be large enough to cushion
disruptions in its regular stream of income.
B. Full Funding is Not Necessary
The [WCB's] $11.4 billion unfunded liability ... threatens the
viability of the workers' compensation system.
37
Hon. Cam Jackson
In my earlier discussions of inflation, I noted that the system is now
only about half funded, given realistic assumptions about inflation,
interest rates, and future adjustments to pension benefits to keep
them abreast of rising prices. This does not pose a threat to the fiscal
soundness of the program. [emphasis added] It simply means that the
Board must use its power to levy assessments in later years to meet
figures are available. The practice of issuing quarterly reports has not been followed since the 1997
First Quarter Report, supra, note 33.
36. This is not to minimize the problem of incomplete coverage under Ontario's workers' compensation
system. The Board is not about to retire, but it's not as young as it used to be either, and expanding
coverage over the growing service sector is necessary to improve its vitality. As noted in the Discus-
sion Paper, Ontario has by far the lowest level of coverage in Canada with only 70% of the
workforce covered, as opposed to 77.4% for Alberta. Coverage for the other provinces and territories
ranges from 80.8% to 100%. Discussion Paper at 45.
37. Discussion Paper at ii.
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future liabilities on a "pay-as-you-go" basis. The main virtue of this
policy is that the Workers' Compensation Board does not drain out of
the private sector massive amounts of capital ... 38
Prof. Paul C. Weiler, Harvard Law School
The requirement that social programs be "sustainable" has become a standard argument
in support of benefit cuts.39 However, there was absolutely no evidence to support the PC
government's assertion that the unfunded liability threatened the financial viability of the
WCB. In fact, the system was designed with the intention that a large portion of its
liabilities would be unfunded, and it successfully weathered both the Great Depression of
the 1930's and the Great Recession of the 1990's without full funding. Politically
independent examinations of the funding question have consistently reached the con-
clusion that full funding is not only unnecessary, but positively undesirable.
When Chief Justice W.R. Meredith was designing the system in the early part of this
century, he considered the funding options in some detail. There were two broad paths
to choose from:
full funding - each year the WCB collects and sets aside enough money to capitalize
all of the future costs of the injuries occurring in that year; and
current cost financing - each year the WCB collects enough money to meet the
payments which become due for present and past injuries.
During the hearings held by Chief Justice Meredith before he designed the system, the
strongest proponent of current cost financing was Mr. Miles M. Dawson, representing
the Canadian Manufacturers' Association. Mr. Dawson pointed out that in the case of
a public monopoly, there was no danger of bankruptcy, even if none of the insurer's
future liabilities were funded.40
Mr. Dawson also tackled the question of fairness to future employers which exercises
the crisis lobby's imagination a great deal. 41
38. Ontario, Reshaping Workers' Compensation for Ontario; A report submitted to the Minister of
Labour by P. Weiler (November 1980) at 82.
39. For a brief discussion of the use of this strategy with respect to workers' compensation, Old Age
Security and Canada Pension Plan benefits, see R. Ellsworth, "Squandering Our Inheritance: Re-
Forming the Canadian Welfare State in the 1990s" (1997) 12 J.L. & Social Policy 259 at 285-286.
40. 'There is no danger of members leaving and joining another scheme, and consequently no danger of
rates rising above normal even when no reserves are set up. It is possible, therefore, under such a
system to merely assess the proper amount to meet each year's current payments without setting up a
reserve to provide for future payments." Ontario, Interim Report on Laws Relating to the Liability of
Employers (Toronto: King's Printer, 27 March 1912) (Commissioner: Hon. Sir William Ralph
Meredith, C.J., C.P.) at 107.
41. For example, the idea has been floated that every time an employer hires a new employee, it accepts
responsibility for $4,000 of the unfunded liability. It is difficult to know what to make of this lament,
since it is the crisis lobby and their government supporters who have been arguing that the unfunded
liability should be retired at the expense of this generation of employers and injured workers. The na-
ture of the calculations used to arrive at the dollar figure remains a mystery.
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The only serious objection which can be urged against a system of current cost as-
sessment is that it involves the throwing on future industry of some burdens accru-
ing in the present. This objection is entirely outweighed by the consideration that
the rate will not, when it reaches its maximum, be any larger than the capitalized
rate, but as experience shows in Germany, will be much lower, and the further con-
sideration that the immense sums of money which it would be necessary to lay
aside as a reserve fund are left in active circulation in the employer's business. But
the theoretical objection itself vanishes when it is remembered that employers and
the community generally are now bearing, and will continue for a generation to bear
the burden of the accidents of the past.42
Chief Justice Meredith accepted the wisdom of these arguments and the workers'
compensation system began on the basis of current cost financing with a reserve. This
might also be called partial funding. In any event, it was well understood from the
outset that the system would carry a significant unfunded liability.
Monopolies and other large employers listed in Schedule 2 of the Act, e.g. railroads
and government bodies, were allowed to self-insure on a pay-as-you-go basis. These
employers paid the cost of injured workers' benefits only as they came due. The
manufacturing concerns and other employers listed in Schedule 1 of the Act paid
assessments based on the risks of their industry. This basic scheme is still in place,
with the exception of the shift in emphasis from current cost financing with adequate
reserves to full funding for Schedule 1 employers.
When the Progressive Conservative government of Bill Davis asked Harvard Law
School Professor Paul Weiler to review the system in the early 1980's, he revisited the
funding issue in light of the movement towards inflation indexing that began in the
mid-1970's. His conclusion was that
a requirement of total funding (on the basis of realistic assumptions about inflation
adjustments) would be much too drastic a response to the problem of equity be-
tween generations of employers.4 3
Examining the possibility of full funding, Professor Weiler noted that
Instead of being available for investment by the private entrepreneurial sector, this
capital would have to be disposed of by public officials in accordance with a neces-
sarily conservative investment program.
When he pointed this out to the business leaders he met with,
they shied away from full funding by the WCB. They believe that the prospects for
economic growth in this province are enhanced by entrepreneurial rather than governmen-
tal control of this huge pool of capital. ... I would treat this gap in funding of workers'
compensation as an implicit loan by the Board to the employers of Ontario.44
42. Supra, note 40 at 111.
43. Supra, note 38 at 83.
44. Ibid., at 75.
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Viewed in the light of these comments, it is clear that not only is full funding
unnecessary, but moving too quickly to establish full funding violates the fundamental
principle of funding fairness that was incorporated into the original scheme. Namely,
in the absence of qualitative leaps in health and safety performance, the best guarantor
of fairness between different generations of employers is the maintenance of a stable
funding ratio. As Professor Andrew Stritch of Bishop's University has noted:
by law, employers cannot be 'unduly or unfairly' burdened by payments to cover
accidents that have happened previously; however, if assessment rates were quickly
raised to a level necessary to achieve full funding, then the burden on employers
would be substantial. A full-funding strategy may, therefore, be illegal.45
Although a full-funding strategy is almost certainly legal in the technical sense,
46
Professor Stritch has clearly identified the policy issue. Fairness to today's employers
demands that they not be forced to pay for the accidents of previous generations within
a short period of time. Rather, equity lies in extending this burden by amortizing the
unfunded liability over a longer period or moving to a strategy of partial funding, or
a combination of the two.
One should also keep in mind just who benefits from the partial funding of the Board.
As noted above, partial funding keeps a huge pool of capital in the hands of employers
rather than the Board. This "loan" to employers allows them to invest that capital as
they see fit. The major beneficiary of this loan is small business, while only govern-
ments and large corporations benefit from the investments of a fully funded system.
As Professor Weiler put it,
One often over-looked virtue of the current system is that the Workers' Compensation
Board is able to invest implicitly in small firms in a manner it could never do with its ac-
tual investment portfolio, which is composed of comparatively gilt-edged securities. 47
Although the Board's investment portfolio has since changed in some fairly dramatic ways
that are very significant for other reasons,48 investment in small business is not one of
those changes. Equity between the various employers of any given generation thus also
favours a strategy of partial funding.
There is a final element in the "viability" defence of full funding, however, which asserts
that it is necessary to secure future payments to injured workers. This could be charac-
45. A. Stritch, "Homage to Catatonia: Bipartite Governance and Workers' Compensation in Ontario" in
T. Thomason et al., Chronic Stress: Workers' Compensation in the 1990s (Toronto: C.D. Howe In-
stitute, 1995) at 166.
46. Professor Stritch is obviously referring to s. 116(1) of the WCA, which states that the Board is to
maintain a reserve fund sufficient to "prevent the employers in future years from being unduly or un-
fairly burdened with payments that are to be made in those years in respect of accidents that have
previously happened." A similar provision can now be found in s. 96(3) of the WSIA. However,
neither provision contains wording which explicitly restricts the Board from forcing the present
generation to pick up the tab for previous generations.
47. Supra, note 38 at 83.
48. See Section III.C. below.
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terized as the Tet Offensive theory of system financing: "We had to cut the benefits in
order to pay them". In fact, the proposition is even more illogical than that, since it
overlooks the fact that an economic disaster sufficient to render pay-as-you-go financing
impossible would also devastate the Board's investment portfolio. This should be too
obviously ludicrous to merit further comment. However, the Business Caucus of the
Premier's Labour Management Advisory Committee did put a new spin on this argument
which cries out for a response.
The Business Caucus argued that full funding "avoids the tendency of later generations
to cut benefits when sufficient funds are not available." 49 This is an impressive display
of faux naivete. The very group lobbying for massive cuts to worker benefits despite the
existence of a reserve fund containing billions of dollars, believes that "later generations"
will not be tempted to cut benefits if "sufficient funds" are available. And this was written
at a time when their constituency was stripping hundreds of millions of dollars annually from
the Board's reserves.50 It should be clear that in the event of serious economic hard times, a
fully funded workers' compensation system would represent a tempting target for government
and business exploitation rather than security for payments to injured workers.
C. What Level of Funding is Necessary?
If full funding is not necessary, what would be an adequate level of funding? The short
answer is this: an amount "sufficient to cover all reasonable contingencies". 51 During his
investigation of the system in 1980, Professor Weiler noted that the Board's method of
valuing its liabilities no longer accurately captured its financial situation. Although
automatic annual indexing of workers' compensation benefits was not brought into the
system until the passage of Bill 81 in 1985,52 defacto annual indexing had existed since
1974 by virtue of a series of ad hoc legislative increases. 53 Here is what he had to say
about the Board's true level of funding and its sufficiency:
[T]he system is now only about half funded, given realistic assumptions about infla-
tion, interest rates, and future adjustments to pension benefits to keep them abreast
of rising prices. This does not pose a threat to the fiscal soundness of the program. 54
In 1990, the WCB published adjusted funding ratio figures dating back to 1990 using the
"realistic assumptions" referred to by Professor Weiler. The results for the period between
1980 and 1984 were as follows:
49. Business Caucus, W.C.B. Secretariat, Premier's Labour Management Advisory Committee, Funding
Mechanisms Working Group Report (18 October 1993) [unpublished] at page 6.
50. See Section IV.B. below.
51. Ontario Workers' Compensation Board, WCB Funding Strategy: Discussion Paper (February, 1992) at 21.
52. Bill 81, An Act to amend the Workers' Compensation Act, 1st Sess., 33d Leg. Ont., 1985.
53. For a history of the ad hoc adjustments, see G. Dee et al., Butterworths Workers' Compensation in
Ontario Service (Toronto: Butterworths, Looseleaf) Table 12-7.
54. Supra, note 38 at 82.
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WCB Funding Ratio, 1980-198455
Yeari- " '1980 1981 198 1983 1984
Funding Ratio 51% 43% 38% 34% 32%
It was this steady decline in the Board's funding ratio which led to the adoption of a
long-term funding strategy in 1984.56 A major cause of the decline was the failure to raise
employer assessment rates to pay for the Legislature's defacto commitment to inflation
indexing. The 1984 funding strategy set out to retire the resulting unfunded liability by
including an amount earmarked for its reduction in each year's assessment rates. In
making the annual determination regarding the amount, the year 2014 was to be used as
the target date for the elimination of the unfunded liability. This date has become the
touchstone for talk about eliminating the unfunded liability, even though the only rationale
for using it is that in 1984 "[t]hirty years was considered a suitable amortization period". 57
When it became clear that the recession of the early 1990s, with its accompanying decline
in revenue, would mean increasing assessment rates to meet the 2014 deadline, the Board
began to reassess its funding strategy. In a discussion paper issued in February 1992, the
WCB suggested that assessment increases could be avoided by lowering the funding ratio
to be achieved and/or lengthening the amortization period for the unfunded liability. For
the most part, the specific options presented in the paper consisted of either full funding
or 70% funding as a goal, with an amortization timetable for reaching that goal stretching
to either 2014 or 2024.58
Were these proposals financially responsible? For the most part, the timetable for amortization
is simply a matter of choice. It represents a standard for setting assessment rates, measuring
progress and demonstrating the resolve necessary to meet the final goal. In fact, considerations
of fairness to the present generation of employers favour a longer amortization period rather
than a shorter one. As the funding strategy discussion paper concluded,
If the current $10.3 billion unfunded liability generated by claims prior to 1992 is fully
paid off by employers from 1992 to 2014, this would constitute a heavy and unfair bur-
den on that particular group. A more even-handed approach, which sought to spread the
responsibility more gradually over time, could be considered more equitable. 59
With respect to the issue of adopting a partial funding strategy, the discussion paper notes
that "[a]s long as the WCB's assets are sufficient to cover all reasonable contingencies,
then partial funding should be adequate." 60 The very presence of 70% funding as an option
55. Ontario Workers' Compensation Board, Workers' Compensation in Ontario: System in Transition,
1985-1990 (April, 1990) Appendix.
56. For a brief discussion of the 1984 funding strategy, see supra, note 51 at i-ii.
57. Ibid., at ii.
58. Ibid., at 3.
59. Ibid., at 21.
60. Ibid.
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indicates that the WCB's actuaries must have considered it sufficient (and the same may
be said for the 2024 amortization timetable as it relates to reasonable contingencies in the
short and medium-term). In light of Professor Weiler's comments to the effect that even
50% funding did not threaten the soundness of the system, the suggestion does not seem
out of line. Indeed, the reasonableness of the 70% option is also accepted by Professor
Stritch in a paper published by the C.D. Howe Institute. This is not a soft option for the
fiscally faint of heart, but appears to be a sound response to employer concerns. As
Professor Stritch states,
If this course were adopted as a long-term strategy, it would relieve some of the
pressure for increased assessment rates, which is a major concern of Ontario's
employers. However, the adoption of this or any other funding strategy first requires
the board to solve its overall decision-making problem.
6 1
Why did employers continue to campaign for full funding by 2014, even though it meant
higher assessment rates and WCB control of a projected $45 billion by 2014?62 Why did
the Harris government lend its unqualified support to the concept of full funding despite
its rejection by Chief Justice Meredith and Professor Weiler? The Royal Commission
appointed by the outgoing NDP government with a mandate to investigate funding options
held months of public hearings and did not even have the opportunity to issue its detailed
discussion paper before being abruptly terminated in favour of Mr. Jackson's truncated
review. His Discussion Paper did not even consider the question of alternative funding
models, but simply proceeded from the assumption that the unfunded liability represented
a financial crisis.
It was clear even before the 1995 election that the goal of the PC Party in the workers'
compensation field was to trim worker benefits. This is what the PC government has
done, using the so-called crisis as its justification. Treating full funding and the 2014
amortization timetable as indisputable presuppositions in talk about WCB finances
helped give focus to the rhetoric and exaggerated the impending "crisis". With each
year that employers successfully suppressed assessment rates, higher future assess-
ments were projected as necessary to meet the 2014 goal. Alternatively, projections
which assumed stable assessment rates seemed to show mammoth increases in the
unfunded liability by 2014. Since the price of fully financing the Board's existing
obligations by 2014 was too high to pay, the only alternative was to cut those
obligations by cutting injured workers' benefits. In reality, however, the projections
of impending doom put forward by the crisis lobby do not stand up to scrutiny.
III. THE STATE OF THE UNFUNDED LIABILITY
Even if everyone had been agreed that a strategy of partially funding the Board's liabilities
should be preferred, there remains the question of whether legislative action by the PC
government was necessary in order to produce stability. On this score, the government
61. Supra, note 45 at 166. The issue of employer concerns regarding "increased" assessment rates is ad-
dressed in Section IV of this paper.
62. Supra, note 51 at 21.
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certainly presented the unfunded liability as though it were growing at a rapid pace and
could not be brought under control without drastic action. Although projections were
produced to demonstrate this point, further examination reveals that the predicted growth
in the unfunded liability results solely from the inflationary presuppositions of the
projections themselves. In real terms, they project a decline in the unfunded liability, with
an accompanying increase in the Board's funding ratio. This should hardly be surprising
in light of the fact that this decline began even before the PC government took power.
Furthermore, the government's projections have already proven to be overly pessimistic, and
part of the explanation is that changes in the Board's investment practices have resulted in an
overestimation of the unfunded liability. It seems highly likely that a realistic appraisal of the
Board's assets would have placed its funding ratio squarely within the 50-70% range before
Bill 99 ever came into force.
A. The Unfunded Liability Was Not Growing
Did you know that ... in just ten years, the unfunded liability of the
Workers' Compensation Board has more than quadrupled from $2.7
billion at the end of 1984 to $11.4 billion at the end of 1994?63
Hon. Cam Jackson
The presentation of the unfunded liability's growth in Mr. Jackson's statement is grossly
misleading. First of all, he ignores the fact that the WCB changed its method of calculating
the unfunded liability in 1985 after the introduction of automatic benefit indexing by Bill 81.
As noted above, Professor Weiler expressed the opinion that this revaluation should have
occurred years earlier. If the unfunded liability at the end of 1984 is calculated using the present
method, the amount is $4.57 billion instead of $2.7 billion.64
Secondly, since the unfunded liability is a capitalized value specific to the year in which
it is calculated, a fair comparison of these figures must be adjusted for inflation. At the end
of 1984, the unfunded liability was 4.57 billion 1984 dollars. Converted into 1994 dollars, the
amount grows to $6.415 billion.65 Expressed in constant 1994 dollars, the ten year increase
from $6.415 billion to $11.402 billion certainly does not represent a quadrupling of the
unfunded liability, despite the severe economic downturn of the early 1990s.
Even more significantly, legislative changes and administrative efficiencies in 1994
resulted in a decrease in the unfunded liability of $130 million.66 As little as two years
63. This statement is taken from the "Media Kit" which accompanied the Discussion Paper.
64. WCB Annual Report 1985 at 30.
65. Inflation adjustments to dollar amounts from past years have been made using the Consumer Price
Index for Canada figures from December of each year as reported in CCH Canada Limited,
Canadian Labour Law Reports (looseleaf) at 29.
66. The fact that the Board did turn the comer at that particular moment in time is attributable to Bill
165, which resulted in a $276 million decrease in benefit expenses for 1994. The de-indexing
provisions reduced the capitalized value of future benefits by $1.805 billion, while the additional
$200 amount paid to the recipients of pension supplements added $1.529 billion. However, even
without Bill 165, the Board would have improved its position from an operational deficiency of $504
million at the end of 1993 to one of $146 million at the end of 1994, a situation which the Board ex-
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earlier, it was not expected that the Board would turn this corner until the late 1990s.
67
This was followed by further decreases of $510 million in 1995 and $432 million in
1996.68 Calculated in constant 1994 dollars, the total decrease in the Board's unfunded
liability between its high point at the end of 1993 and the end of 1996 amounts to $1.498
billion. The WCB's financial performance through the first quarter of 1997 indicates that
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5.381 6.207 6.691 7.350 1 8.469 9.088 10.347 11.028 11.532 11.402 10.892 1 10.500
Unfunded Liability 7.238 8.015 8.296 8.764 9.605 9.815 10.767 11.241 11.559 11.402 10.702 10.061
(1994$)
Funding Ratio 31.8 32.5 35.6 38.0 40.0 40.8 38.3 37.4 36.6 37.4 40.0 42.9
plained as resulting from improvements in service delivery, lower administrative expenses and
higher net assessment revenue. WCB Annual Report 1994 at 13-14.
67. Supra, note 51 at 3.
68. WCB Annual Report 1996 at 9.
69. Supra, note 33.
70. WCB Annual Report 1985 at 30; WCB Annual Report 1994 at 15 and 35; WCB Annual Report 1996
at 15 and 28. Inflation adjustments made using the method described at supra, note 65.
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The most significant statistic, however, is the Board's funding ratio, i.e. the ratio of its
present assets to the capitalized value of the future payments for which it is liable. This
figure actually rose from 32.1% in 1984 to 37.4% at the end of 1994, despite some setbacks
caused by the recession. While the PC government was designing its legislative package,
the Board's funding ratio continued to improve, reaching 42.9% by the end of 1996. That
represents the best showing since 1981, and once again the initial financial figures for
1997 indicate that further improvement should be expected. In fact, every projection of
future performance released by the WCB or the government since 1994 has predicted that
the unfunded liability would continue to decline in real terms and that the funding ratio
would continue to rise indefinitely without any further legislative change or even changes
in policy or administration. Yet successive administrations have used these same figures
to push for further savings on the backs of injured workers.
B. Decreases in the Unfunded Liability Were Expected to Continue
Without intervention in the system, the unfunded liability is likely to
increase to over $14 billion by the year 2014, rather than be
eliminated.71
Hon. Cam Jackson
In projections released in 1994, after Bill 165 was a fait accompli and prior to the
Progressive Conservative ascension to power, the WCB predicted that its unfunded
liability would continue to decline in real terms without any further legislative interven-
tion. In fact, although these projections were made public as an accompaniment to a
package of cost-cutting policies, they demonstrated that even policy changes were not
necessary to achieve a steady real decline in the unfunded liability. The policy package
in question appears to have been brought forward solely in order to meet the artificial
deadline of 2014 for the complete elimination of the unfunded liability.72
According to the Board's projections, with no further action the unfunded liability in 2014
would have been $12.886 billion, an apparent increase. Converted to constant 1994
dollars, however, the amount is equivalent to $5.999 billion, a decrease of 47% in real
terms over 20 years. 73 During this same period, the funding ratio was projected to increase
from 37.4% to 55.2%.74 None of this should come as a surprise in light of the benefit
71. Discussion Paper at 8.
72. Ontario Workers' Compensation Board, Financial Improvements Package (12 October 1994) Graph.
#2 (hereinafter FIP).
73. Inflation adjustments for future projections of the unfunded liability contained in the FIP have been
made using the WCB's standard actuarial assumptions of 2.65% for 1995, 3.30% for 1996 and 4%
thereafter. These assumptions are taken from Ontario Workers' Compensation Board, Actuarial Ser-
vices Branch, Workers' Compensation Board Schedule I Projection, List of Assumptions, Basic As-
sumptions (11 August 1993). This list of assumptions was used in formulating the projections used
by the PLMAC during the negotiations preceding Bill 165. The 47% decrease in the unfunded
liability is calculated from the actual year-end figure for 1994 ($11.403 billion), rather than the
projected figure for that year contained in the FIP ($11.012 billion).
74. Once again, the actual funding ratio for year-end at 1994 (37.4%) is used in place of the projection
contained in the FIP of 37%.
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cut-backs contained in the NDP's Bill 165, specifically the loss of full indexation. The
capitalized value of the Board's total liabilities - i.e. the amount of money needed in the
accident fund to make all future payments to and for the benefit of injured workers -
was expected to drop from $18.2 billion in 1994 to $13.39 billion in constant 1994 dollars
by the year 2014, a real decrease of 26%.
First Unfunded Liability Projection, 199475
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1994 1999 2005 2010 2014
* Unfunded Liability (billions) (Y1)
Unfunded Liability (1994$) (Y1)
* Funding Ratio (Y2)
Yea )., , ~I94~ :1999 2W 21 2014.
Unfunded Liability (billions $) 11.012 12.860 14.672 14.695 12.886
Unfunded Liability (1994$) 11.012 10.781 9.722 8.003 5.999
Funding Ratio % 37.0 34.6 36.3 43.8 55.2
As quoted above, in his Discussion Paper, Mr. Jackson claimed to have revised
estimates which showed that the unfunded liability would increase to over $14 billion
by 2014 unless legislative action was taken. In fact the "Media Kit" which accom-
panied the paper specified $14.5 billion.76 Although the government did not release
any further figures at that time, it was pointed out in an earlier version of the present
text that even this figure would represent a real decrease in the unfunded liability and
a funding ratio of over 50% and rising in 2014 - unless the revised projection
involved radically new assumptions regarding inflation. 7
7
75. Supra, note 72.
76. Supra, note 63.
77. D. Wilken, "The Numbers Racket: Manufacturing Crisis in Workers' Compensation" (March 1996)
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This was confirmed when details of the projection were released as "Appendix B" to
the New Directions Report. Although the revision of some assumptions did result in
a projected unfunded liability of $14.494 billion in 2014, the figure in constant 1994
dollars was only $6.893 billion. That would still represent a decrease of 40% in real
terms from the 1994 figure of $11.403 billion. It would also mark an increase in the
funding ratio from 37.4% to 54.1%.
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1994 1999 2005 2010 2014
* Unfunded Liability (billions) (Y1)
Unfunded Liability (1994$) (Y1)
[] Funding Ratio (Y2)
Year' Y<I' 1994, 2005' '2010 2014'
Unfunded Liability (billions $) 11.403 12.378 13.512 14.204 14.494
Unfunded Liability (1994$) 11.403 10.601 9.145 7.902 6.892
Funding Ratio % 37.4 39.7 44.7 49.6 54.1
However, by the time the New Directions Report was released in June 1996, a problem
with the projection had arisen. Namely, the end of year financial statistics for 1995
had become available, and they exposed the conservative nature of the government's
predictions. By the end of 1995, the unfunded liability and funding ratio had already
made gains which had not been expected for four to five years. The funding ratio had
10:2 The I.A.V.G.O. Reporting Service 1 at 12.
78. New Directions Report, Appendix B. Conversions to constant 1994 dollars have been made using the
assumptions stated in the projection of 2.5 % inflation for 1995, 2.75% for 1996, 3% for 1997, 3.5%
for 1998 and 4% thereafter.
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risen to 40%, while the unfunded liability had declined to $10.892 billion or $10.626
billion in constant 1994 dollars.
This led to a new projection which began from the actual 1995 results, but used the
same methods that had led the initial projection to become obsolete in less than one
year. Even using that conservative method, the results of this third projection basically
restored the results publicized by the Board in 1994, before the PC government came
to power. In fact, the projected unfunded liability of $6.004 billion 1994 dollars in
2014 is within $5 million of the first projection. However, the third projection did
predict a funding ratio of 60.1% by 2014, an even better result than in the first
projection. 79








1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
*] Unfunded Liability (billions) (YI)
*] Unfunded Liability (1994$) (Y1)
* Funding Ratio (Y2)
Unfunded Liability (billions $) 10.892 11.730 12.490 12.831 12.626
Unfunded Liability (1994$) 10.626 9.659 8.454 7.138 6.004
Funding Ratio % 40.0 43.7 48.5 54.4 60.1
79. The use of more conservative methods to value the Board's liabilities means that although the dollar
amount of the unfunded portion is basically the same, the amount of the overall liability is greater.
The proportion of the liability that is funded is correspondingly greater.
80. New Directions Report, Appendix I. Conversions to constant 1994 dollars have been made using the
figures set out at supra, note 78.
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Obviously, this third projection was not a very impressive foundation for the
government's crisis rhetoric, so a fourth projection was done at the same time. While
based on essentially the same premises as the previous two, it also took into account
the effects of the 5% cut in employer assessment rates promised during the 1995
election campaign and slated for implementation in 1997. The result was the biggest
projection yet of the unfunded liability in the year 2014 - $18.435 billion. Even this
figure, however, represents a real decrease in the unfunded liability from $10.626
billion to $8.767 billion constant 1994 dollars, accompanied by a relentless increase
in the Board's funding ratio.
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1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
Unfunded Liability (billions) (Y1)
Unfunded Liability (1994$) (Y1)
U] Funding Ratio (Y2)
Unfunded Liability (billions $) 10.892 12.335 14.270 16.463 18.435
Unfunded Liability (1994$) 10.626 10.157 9.659 9.159 8.767
Funding Ratio % 40.0 40.8 41.2 41.5 41.7
81. New Directions Report, Appendix II. Conversions to constant 1994 dollars have been made using the
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It will be noted that although the projected increase in the funding ratio is relentless,
it is also minuscule. So minuscule, in fact, that the funding ratio of 42.9% which the
Board accomplished by the end of 1996 already far exceeded the 41.7% figure
projected for 2014. In other words, in less than one year, the funding ratio improved
by 2.9% when an increase of only 1.7% was projected for a period of 19 years. The
first quarter results for 1997 indicated a further increase in the funding ratio to
43.8%.82 In short, the Board's funding ratio was growing at more than 40 times the
rate predicted in the fourth projection. At that point, quarterly financial reporting
ceased.83
C. The Amount of the Unfunded Liability has been Systematically
Exaggerated
The projections released by Mr. Jackson are not the first doomsday scenarios which
have failed to materialize. A major factor in both creating and dispelling these
impending disasters is that the unfunded liability has been systematically exaggerated
through the use of highly conservative methods to value the Board's assets and
liabilities. Any estimate of the unfunded liability requires that assumptions be made
regarding future inflation, the performance of the WCB's investments and the lifespan
of injured workers. In recent years, the most important factor leading to an exaggera-
tion of the unfunded liability has been the choice of the discount rate used to value the
Board's liabilities.
Here the term "discount" refers to a deduction made for future interest or returns on
investment. The significance in the workers' compensation context is that the Board's
liabilities, the payments it must make to and on behalf of injured workers for accidents
which have already occurred, take the form of payments to be made over many years.
To cover the liabilities created in any given year, it is not necessary to set aside each
dollar which will be paid in future years, but rather enough so that the amount set aside
together with the earnings from investing it will be sufficient to meet the payments.
The "discount rate" used to reduce the future stream of payments to a present lump
sum for investment reflects the expected real rate of interest or return on investment,
i.e. the return over and above the rate of inflation.
At the end of 1996, the capitalized value of the Board's future liabilities was set at
$18.332 billion. This figure is based on the assumption that any investments made in
the present will return 3% over the rate of inflation each year in the future. Since the
Board had $7.872 billion invested at that time, it had a funding ratio of 42.9% and an
unfunded liability of $10.460 billion. While there is certainly some virtue in erring on
the side of caution in this matter, a 3% discount rate is below the industry standard for
workers' compensation insurers. Consequently, it overestimates the amount of the
unfunded liability.
82. See supra, note 33 at 4. At the end of the first quarter of 1997, the WCB had assets of $8.098 billion
and liabilities of $18.474 billion.
83. Ibid.
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The National Council on Compensation Insurance, a lobbying group for private
insurers in the United States, recommends a discount rate of 3.5% for private insurance
companies. 84 Despite the fact that they are not monopoly insurers like the WCB, this
is considered a responsible method for valuing their liabilities. The 3.5% rate is also
used by Alberta's Workers' Compensation Board. 85 If Ontario were to adopt this
standard, estimates of the unfunded liability would be cut dramatically overnight. 86
Could the Ontario Board justify raising its discount rate to 3.5%? The answer to this
question is a clear "yes", given that the actual performance of the investment fund has




1994 8.2% 8.7% 10.5%
1995 11.5% 12.1% 10.4%
1996 10.7% 11.8% 10.8%
1994 6.8% 6.1% 7.0%
1995 10.3% 10.2% 7.2%
1996 9.3% 10.2% 7.8%
These returns are not aberrations. Rather, they reflect a significant shift in the
composition of the WCB's investment fund since 1985. At roughly the same time that
automatic annual indexing was introduced, the Board began pursuing a more aggres-
sive investment policy. In particular, there has been a major shift from relatively low
yielding long-term bonds and mortgages to equities. In fact, investments in equities
rose from nothing to a little more than one-third of the Board's portfolio between 1985
and 1994. By the end of 1996, this proportion had risen to more than one-half of the
portfolio. Under an investment policy adopted by the WCB Board of Directors in 1993,
84. Joanne Wojick, "Critics not swayed by state fund growth", Business Insurance, (Sept. 16, 1991). It
should be parenthetically noted that the "critics" of state funds in the U.S. are never swayed by any-
thing. They are the private insurers who stand to lose profitable markets.
85. T. Boygo, "Workers' Compensation: Updating the Historic Compromise" in Thomason et al., supra,
note 45 at 112.
86. For example, when the Workers' Compensation Board of British Columbia raised its discount rate
from 2 3/8% to 3% in 1993, the value of its liabilities decreased by $400 million. Ibid. at 111. The
B.C. Board reported this as a decrease of $390 million, or nearly 10% of its total liabilities of $4.219
billion at the beginning of 1993. Workers' Compensation Board of British Columbia, Annual Report
1993: Part I - Corporate and Financial Information at 35 and 42.
87. WCB Annual Report 1994 at 19; WCB Annual Report 1005 at 7; WCB Annual Report 1996 at 14.
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equities and real estate may comprise up to three-quarters of the Board's invest-
ments.88 But the discount rate has never been adjusted to account for this change in
the portfolio's asset mix, despite impressive returns such as the 16.6% market return
for 1996. 89
Composition of Investment Portfolio9°
(end of year)
Long-term Bonds 72.4% 67.6% 44.8% 36.8%
Mortgages 21.1% 18.2% 4.7% t
Short-term Securities 6.5% 8.5% 11.1% 2.6%
Real Estate 0.0% 0.0% 4.5% t
Equities 0.0% 5.7% 34.9% 56.7%
All of this should lead to the conclusion that a discount rate of even more than 3.5%
could be justified. There is some precedent for this. In 1991, the Colorado legislature
authorized its state fund to adopt a discount rate of 6% even though it is a competitive
fund rather than a monopoly insurer.91 If this discount rate had been used to value the
WCB's liabilities, Ontario would certainly have had a funding ratio in the 50-70%
range prior to the passage of Bill 99. Furthermore, if a 6% discount rate were used in
projections of Board finances, these would predict a large surplus in 2014 even without
any savings from Bill 99 or the collection of a single assessment dollar for the purpose
of paying off the unfunded liability.92
If nothing else, a consideration of the discount rate demonstrates the extent to which
the unfunded liability is a malleable theoretical concept rather than a terrifying
practical crisis. Now that the Bill 99 cutbacks are in place, the government is free to
put a new spin on the Board's finances if it wishes. This is one of the major advantages
of a manufactured crisis. In light of the change in the asset mix and the actual market
88. Ontario Workers' Compensation Board, Board of Directors, BOD Minute #5 (17 December 1993)
Page 5736 at 5.
89. WCB Annual Report 1996 at 14.
90. WCB Annual Report 1986 at 15; WCB Annual Report 1994 at 19; WCB Annual Report 1996 at 14.
f - For 1996, mortgages and real estate together constituted 3.9% of the portfolio at the year's end.
91. Supra, note 84.
92. Applying the 6% discount rate to the FIP projections of the Board's future liabilities results in a
surplus of over $20 billion and a funding ratio of over 200% in 2014, based on an annual market
return of 10% on the investment portfolio. The 10% rate is chosen based on the WCB's assumption
of 4% annual inflation in projecting its future liabilities. It is assumed that assessments would be col-
lected only at a rate sufficient to cover the new liabilities created in each year.
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returns since the mid-1980s, the government may raise the discount rate while
remaining suitably conservative. The effect of such a change on top of the Bill 99 cuts
would result in an immediate, precipitous drop in the Board's total liablities, while
greatly accelerating the amortization of any remaining unfunded liability.
The flexibility which the government now enjoys extends to the area of assessment
rates. The present low discount rate also explains how it is possible that the unfunded
liability is not much larger, despite the fact that employers pay nothing near the target
assessment rates set by the Board's actuaries and appropriated $1.4 billion dollars in
WCB assets during the period between 1989 and 1994.
IV. THE UNFUNDED LIABILITY AND WCB ASSESSMENT RATES
About 30 per cent of the $3.00 average rate or $.88 is dedicated to
eliminating the unfunded liability by the year 2014. By contrast,
unfunded liabilities are a small component of rates charged by U.S.
insurers and state workers' compensation administrators, and the
rates are correspondingly lower.93
Hon. Cam Jackson
The liabilities of the workers' compensation system are funded through assessments
paid by employers. These assessments are expressed as an amount per $100 of
assessable payroll which varies depending on the nature of the business that the
employer operates. "Assessable payroll" is generally reported by employers using the
gross wages from T-4 summaries sent to Revenue Canada, up to the maximum earnings
which may be insured in any given year.94 The maximum in 1997 was $56,100.95
Every year the Board's actuaries set target assessment rates for the various rate groups
based on projections of the accident costs for the rate group in the coming year, the
ongoing costs of administering the system, and an amount dedicated toward paying
down the unfunded liability of the rate group by 2014.96 These target rates are
submitted to the Board of Directors for approval. Often, the target rates are then
lowered due to political pressure from employers. Such a change occurred in 1994
when the $3.20 average target rate was lowered to $3.01. 97
93. Discussion Paper at 8.
94. Ontario Workers' Compensation Board, Operational Policy Manual, Document No. 08-04-03 at 1
(hereinafter OPM).
95. OPM, Document No. 05-01-02 at 5. The maximum for each year is set at 175% of the average in-
dustrial wage for Ontario. Compare WCA, s.38(1)(c) and WSJA, s.54(1).
96. For an overview of rate setting practices in Ontario, see Association of Workers' Compensation
Boards of Canada, Workers' Compensation Industry Classifications, Assessment Rates and Ex-
perience Rating Programs in Canada 1997 (Edmonton: 1997) at 14.
97. Discussion Paper at 44.
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Under further analysis, the statement quoted above from Mr. Jackson's Discussion
Paper is really quite inaccurate and misleading. Since new accident costs and ongoing
administrative expenses must be paid first, deviations from the target rate due to
politically compromised rate-setting or revenue leakage directly reduce the portion
dedicated to the unfunded liability. The 19¢ decrease in the 1994 target rate, for
example, lowered the amount available to reduce the unfunded liability from 89¢ to
70¢. Revenue leakage in the form of rebates and bad debts that same year reduced the
figure to 22¢.98
A. Workers' Compensation Costs Were Not as High as Claimed
The target rates presented to the Board of Directors each year are estimates based on
actuarial projections, as are the rates they eventually set. What Mr. Jackson presented
as "Actual Average Rates" at page 44 of his Discussion Paper were actually the rates
set by the Board of Directors. Determining the average actual cost of workers'
compensation coverage requires one to move beyond those projections and look at
how the books balance at the end of the year. Only after several factors have been
taken into account can the actual cost be determined.
First is the actual distribution of payroll based on reports from employers. When the
WCB reports its average target or standard (Board of Directors) rates, it reports
weighted averages based on projections of the assessable payroll in each of the rate
groups. As an example of the weighted average concept, suppose there are only two
rate groups, with standard assessment rates of $11 and $4, respectively. If the payroll
for the two groups is equal, the average rate will be $7.50, i.e. $15.00 divided by 2
units of payroll. But if the payroll for the first group was 6 times larger than that for
the second, the average would be $10. This takes into account 6 units of payroll at a
rate of $11 plus 1 unit at a rate of $4, for a total of $70. Divided by 7 units of payroll,
the weighted average is $10. This concept is especially important when comparing
average rates across jurisdictional lines. Once the average rate set by the Board of
Directors for 1994 is adjusted for the actual distribution of payroll that year, it is seen
to be slightly higher than $3.01 at $3.09 per $100 of assessable payroll. 99
Second, there is the problem of bad debts. Particularly during a period of economic
downturn, the Board loses revenue through its failure to collect assessments in a timely
fashion. This can create a situation where employers who leave Ontario or suffer
business reverses receive free workers' compensation coverage. When they later close
or go bankrupt, their assessments remain unpaid. In 1994, the charge against lost
98. The actual cost of workers' compensation coverage per $100 of assessable payroll in 1994 was
$2.53. This figure is derived from a comparison of reported payroll with net assessment revenue
from Schedule 1 employers in 1994. WCB Annual Report 1994 at 16.
99. This figure is derived from a comparison of reported payroll ($82.818 billion) and actual gross as-
sessments ($2.557 billion) for Schedule 1 employers in 1994. The deviation upward is caused by
greater than expected economic activity in industries with relatively high assessment rates. WCB An-
nual Report 1994 at 16.
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revenue for employer bad debts was $173 million. 100 This was followed by bad debt
charges of $164 million and $98 million in 1995 and 1996.101
Third, the experience rating off-balance costs the WCB hundreds of millions of dollars
in lost revenue each year. The NEER and CAD-7 experience rating programs collect
surcharges from and issue rebates to employers based on their accident cost ex-
perience. 102 Those businesses within a rate group which have better accident cost
records pay less than those with worse records. In theory, this provides an incentive
to run safe and healthy workplaces. 103 These programs were originally intended to be
revenue neutral, with surcharges and rebates cancelling each other out. However, they
have grown increasingly out of balance. Refunds charged against revenue in the 1994
accident year exceeded surcharges by $359 million. 104 That is more than all of the
short-term disability benefits paid to the workers of Schedule 1 employers in the same
year, which amounted to $337 million. 10 5 Net refunds were $247 million in 1995 and
$297 million in 1996. The latter figure once again exceeded short-term disability
payments for that same year ($242 million).
106
When employer bad debts and the experience rating off-balance are taken into
account, along with interest and penalties charged to employers, the actual cost for
insuring $100 of assessable payroll in 1994 drops to $2.53. This means that 18%
of the assessments that employers should have paid based on their reported payroll
and the rates set by the Board of Directors were either refunded or never col-
lected. 107 When this analysis is extended to cover the entire period between 1985 and
1994, it appears that workers' compensation costs in Ontario were at their lowest level
since 1985.
100. Ibid.
101. The Board's billing methods were changed in 1996 in an attempt to address the problem of bad
debts. However, the $66 million drop in bad debts as compared with 1995 was partially offset by a
$42 million drop in interest and penalties. WCB Annual Report 1996 at 11-12.
102. The CAD-7 (Council Amendment to Draft #7) plan operates in the construction industry, while the
New Experimental Experience Rating (NEER) plan applies to other classes of industry. For an over-
view of these programs, see supra, note 96 at 36-40.
103. Advocates for injured workers have long argued that in practice, these programs are really just an in-
vitation to suppress claims and aggressively "manage" those claims which are filed. See Biggin et
al., supra, note 5 at 57-60. For an overview of academic appraisals see E. Tucker, "The Employer
Response to Experience Rating: What Can the Studies Tell Us?" (December 1997)12:1 The
I.A.V.G.O. Reporting Service 13. Professor Tucker reaches the conclusion that "the academic litera-
ture does not lend strong empirical support for the ER [experience rating] hypothesis. Indeed, much
of the literature suggests ER promotes socially undesirable behaviour by employers."
104. WCB Annual Report 1994 at 16.
105. Ibid. at 28.
106. WCB Annual Report 1996 at 11 and 22.
107. An 18% reduction is arrived at beginning from the $3.09 rate based on actual payroll distribution.
Supra, note 99.
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Employer Costs for Workers' Compensation 08
The above analysis covers the period from 1985 to 1994 due to the importance of these
years in the documents put forward by Mr. Jackson. However, there are also certain
inherent limitations to this type of analysis. First of all, it does not account for the
actual distribution of payroll as a factor in the comparison. Thus, for example, the
actual cost of workers' compensation coverage jumps to $2.77 in 1995 and then
declines slightly to $2.72 in 1996. However, the properly weighted average standard
rate as set by the Board of Directors was also higher at $3.12 and $3.15, respectively.10 9
This would seem to indicate that the only fair way to make year-to-year comparisons
is by rate group. However, these are not strictly comparable on a year-to-year basis
for the period in question, given that Ontario moved from 108 to 219 rate groups on
January 1, 1993 to correct inequities within the groups."10 Furthermore, the discon-
108. WCB Annual Report 1985-1996, passim. Discussion Paper at 44. Actual cost figures are derived
from a comparison of reported payroll with net assessment revenue from Schedule l employers. The
net assessment revenue amounts reported by the Board are adjusted for experience rating net refunds
and bad debts as well as interest and penalties on late payments.
109. WCB Annual Report 1996 at 11 and 28.
110. Association of Workers' Compensation Boards of Canada, Workers' Compensation Industry Classifica-
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tinuity was not confined to that particular year, since the process of adjusting rates as
a result of the reclassification has been going on ever since. As of January 1, 1998,
only one of the 219 rate groups had reached its proper rate. The annual change in any
given group's rate may reflect a shifting of costs within the system rather than a real
increase or decrease in the cost of claims. Also, figures for the experience rating
off-balance and bad debts are not publicly available by rate group.
Finally, while improvements in the Board's performance with respect to the off-balance
and bad debts increase the figures for actual cost, should these really be considered as
"costs" in light of the large operational surpluses for 1995 and 1996? The choice to collect
and retain revenue sufficient to create a surplus which is used to pay down the unfunded
liability is, as explained above, a policy choice rather than a matter of financial necessity.
The relatively modest surplus in 1994, however, means that the $2.53 figure for actual
cost in that year should be considered reasonable.
The information necessary to make that calculation was available to Mr. Jackson at the
time he issued his discussion paper. And if there could be any doubt as to whether he was
aware that the true cost of workers' compensation was much less than the standard Board
of Directors rate of $3.01, the $2.53 figure was brought to his attention and even received
some media coverage."'t Yet the impact of revenue leakage was downplayed, as Mr.
Jackson and later Ms. Witmer attempted to shift the blame for its consequences onto the
level of benefits paid to injured workers.
B. The Investment Fund has Suffered From Employer Greed
During the period 1991-95, the WCB was compelled to transfer
substantial sums annually from its investment portfolio (assets) to
general operations in order to pay each year's benefit payments. To
date, these operational cash shortfalls amount to $1.65 billion (of
which $250 million was transferred back into investments at the end
of 1995). The effect of transferring significant sums every year from
investments to pay for ongoing benefit costs is that interest is lost on
these sums and they cannot be re-invested to ensure asset growth. 112
Hon. Cam Jackson
Mr. Jackson's statement conceals and distorts the cause of these investment fund transfers.
In fact, not one penny was necessary to pay benefits to injured workers. Every cent was
paid out to employers in experience rating net refunds and bad debts. While net transfers
from the WCB's investment fund to general operations for the period 1990-1994 totalled
tions, Assessment Rates and Experience Rating Programs in Canada 1992 (Edmonton: 1992) at 8.
111. Supra, note 79 at 16-17; M. Mittelstaedt, "OFL accuses government of distorting WCB woes", The
Globe and Mail, (8 March 1996) D5; M. Gibb-Clark and M. Mittelstaedt, "Scare about WCB finan-
ces is unjustified, lawyer says: Accuses minister of citing misleading figures on unfunded liability",
The Globe and Mail, (15 March 1996) B6; T. Walkom, "Workers' Compensation: The crisis that
never was", The Toronto Star, (30 March 1996) B4.
112. Discussion Paper at 8.
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$1.4 billion, WCB payouts to employers for that same period amounted to over $1.75
billion.11 3 Among other things, this represents a massive shifting of costs to small
businesses who pick up the tab for the experience rating off-balance and the Second Injury
and Enhancement Fund transfers that experience rating encourages., 14
Asset Stripping by Employers "15
Cumulative totals of investment fund transfers and revenue losses
due to experience rating off-balance and employer bad debts
113. Based on the difference between gross assessments (expected revenue based on actually reported
payroll) and net assessments for Schedule 1 employers. WCB Annual Report 1990-1994, passim.
114. Second Injury and Enhancement Fund (SIEF) relief allows an employer to shift a portion of the costs
of a particular claim from its accident cost record to the notional SIEF fund when a pre-existing con-
dition, whether compensable or not, contributes to an injury or enhances its effect. The laudable in-
tentions of the program are to combat perceived disincentives to hiring injured and other disabled
workers and to protect individual employers from the unpredictable cost consequences of claims in-
volving "thin-skulled" workers. In reality, it also produces a great deal of cost-shifting from
employers with the means to aggressively manage claims onto small business and others who do not
engage in such behaviour.
115. WCB Annual Report 1990-1994, passim.
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Revenue Loss
Investment Fund Transfers
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If they took their own pessimistic scenarios seriously, one would have expected the
crisis lobby and the government to strongly protest the experience rating deficit and
uncollected assessments. No such protest occurred. This is not surprising given that
those who benefit most from these phenomena are those who act as advocates for
employers.
Far from provoking employer protests, the off-balance may be the raison d'etre of the
Board's experience rating programs at this point in time. As Professor Eric Tucker of
Osgoode Hall Law School points out, empirical research to date does not provide
strong support for the effectiveness of experience rating as a means of encouraging
workplace health and safety.
Why then do we have ER [experience rating]? Largely because employers want it.
The design of ER in Ontario has resulted in an enormous discrepancy between
penalties and rewards. ... Large firms especially benefit from ER because they are
able, through claims management, to reduce their compensation costs and qualify
for substantial rebates, without making costly investments to improve occupational
health and safety. Workers bear the cost of this practice. They are under pressure not
to report claims, to report lost-time claims as non lost-time claims and to participate
in inappropriate return to work schemes.1 16
One should perhaps add that those who advise and advocate on behalf of these large
employers are the claims managers themselves. These same lawyers and consultants
have no doubt advised other employers on how to move out of Ontario or declare
bankruptcy while avoiding WCB assessments. The result is free workers' compensa-
tion coverage for their final year of operation in Ontario. The shortfall must be made
up by other employers - or through investment fund transfers.
Before 1990, when employers began strip-mining assets in earnest, the WCB managed
to keep revenue leakage to less than 3% of expected assessment revenue. If this record
had been maintained during the 1990-1994 period, the WCB's funding ratio would
have been over 45% at the end of 1994.117 Despite the severe economic downturn, the
investment fund transfers were not necessary to meet benefits needs, and the Board
did nothing to reign in employer greed. Instead, the Bill 165 cutbacks allowed the
Board to reenter the black without decisive action on revenue issues, while Bill 99
was overkill by any standard.
C. The Unfunded Liability Does Not Cause Assessment Rates to Rise
One of the distinct advantages which a phony, manufactured crisis offers is the ease
with which it can be resolved. This is certainly the case with the rising WCB
assessment rates which supposedly endangered Ontario's ability to compete in the
116. Supra, note 103 at 14.
117. This assumes the Board's 1994 valuation of its liabilities using the 3% discount rate ($18.2 billion)
and also that the revenue lost would have earned the 5-year market return of 8.7% beginning on the
last day of the year in which it was lost. The additional $1.576 billion in the investment fund at the
end of 1994 would have resulted in a funding ratio of 46%.
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global economy. There is little doubt that both the government and the Board were at
all times well aware of the discrepancy between the standard rates approved by the
Board of Directors and given wide publicity each year and the actual cost of WCB
coverage.
As noted above in Section IV.A., when the Board of Directors set an average
assessment rate of $3.01 per $100 of assessable payroll in 1994, the actual cost to
employers was $2.53. This trend continued in 1995 and 1996, when the actual cost of
coverage was $2.77 and $2.72 respectively, despite published rates of $3.00.
In 1997, the Board implemented the PC election promise of a 5% decrease in employer
assessment rates, resulting in a published rate of $2.85. It will likely be some time
before the actual cost to employers can be calculated, as the Board has suspended its
practice of publishing quarterly financial reports.' 18 However, we have a clue in the
1998 assessment rates that were released on October 20, 1997.
One single sentence paragraph from a "News Release" issued on that date states that
"The average rate for 1998 will be $2.59 down from $2.85 in 1997." If one perseveres
in reading the release and accompanying materials, however, one learns that "this does
not result in a significant net reduction to the employer costs". Rather, "it more
accurately describes the true cost of the system." In other words, the cost of coverage
in 1997, before the passage of Bill 99 and with the Board operating at a surplus, was
only $2.59.119
And this figure does not even take employer bad debts into account. The phony
decrease is based solely on the payment of experience rating refunds on a prospective
basis. Rather than setting a $3.00 rate which is effectively reduced through the
experience rating off-balance, experience rating rebates are paid up front in lower
rates. As a result, employer costs not only seem to go down, but the experience rating
off-balance becomes much harder to pin down.
Placing this spin on matters nearly triples the apparent effect of the 5% rate reduction,
while at the same time accelerating the amortization of the unfunded liability. The
latter is effected by applying the substantial savings from Bill 99 to the unfunded
liability, rather than funnelling them directly to employers through even lower rates.
As previously noted, the Board's standard rate-setting model consists of setting an
amount for all future payments related to the injuries occurring in that year, an amount
to pay for ongoing administrative costs of the Board, and an amount necessary to reach
the goal of eliminating the unfunded liability by 2014. For 1998, these figures are
$1.08 for current claims cost, 42¢ for administration and 79¢ for amortization of the
unfunded liability, for a total of $2.29. The additional 30¢ on the published rate
represents an amount which could be permanently dropped from the assessment rate
due to Bill 99. Of that amount, half will be used in 1998 to fully fund the reinstatement
118. Supra, note 33.
119. Ontario Workers' Compensation Board, News Release: 1998 Premium Rates (20 October 1997).
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of survivor's benefits for spouses who remarried prior to 1985. This is a one time
charge. The other half has been named "special reserve applied to unfunded liability"
to reflect the fact that "it is essential that the savings created by the reform be applied
directly to the reduction of the unfunded liability." This presumably means that the
entire 300 will be applied to the unfunded liability in the future. 120
In January 1996, Mr. Jackson wrote that "About 30 per cent of the average rate or $.88
is dedicated to eliminating the unfunded liability by the year 2014."121 His point was
to demonstrate that it was the unfunded liability which caused uncompetitive assess-
ment rates. Benefits for injured workers therefore had to be slashed.
Two years later, about 36% of the average rate is dedicated to eliminating the unfunded
liability, and we may expect this to rise to 42% in 1999. This will give the government
significant flexibility over the coming years to cut assessment rates, eliminate the
unfunded liability on an accelerated basis or pursue a combination of the two goals.
For the time being, it has declared the intention to pay down the unfunded liability. 122
Meanwhile, on paper, assessment rates have gone down from $3.00 to $2.59 per $100 of
assessable payroll based on a cut that would amount to only 14/100ths of one percent of
payroll even if wages and workers' compensation assessments were the only payroll costs.
No clairvoyance is necessary to see that "lower" rates will soon be transformed into the
achievement of a PC government which has helped to make Ontario's businesses
competitive again. It should, however, be clear that the following conclusions are more
accurate: first, the unfunded liability does not raise or lower assessment rates - people
do; and second, Bill 99 was not necessary to create competitive assessment rates. If
post-Bill 99 rates are competitive, then so were the pre-Bill 99 rates.
V. WCB ASSESSMENT RATES AND COMPETITIVENESS
A. Ontario vs. Quibec
Ontario employers currently pay an average premium of $3.00 for
every $100 of payroll, which is the second highest in Canada and 32
per cent higher than the national average. 12
3
Hon. Cam Jackson
As explained above, the actual cost of workers' compensation in Ontario does not
correspond to the average standard rate set by the Board of Directors. Using this figure
120. Ibid.
121. Discussion Paper at 8.
122. The difficulty here is the ongoing conversion to a more detailed classification system, resulting in
drastic assessment increases and decreases for some employers. According to the materials released
by the Board, 71 rate groups will have increased rates in 1998. Supra, note 119. Although the Board
of Directors has placed a cap on how quickly rates may increase, pressure from these employers
could result in concessions.
123. Discussion Paper at 7.
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to portray Ontario's rates as out of step with the rest of the country was simply
misleading. Ontario's closest Canadian competitor in terms of size, population, and
industrial base is Quebec. In the same section of his paper, Mr. Jackson presented a
chart which put Quebec's average assessment rate at $2.60 while Ontario's was $3.00,
or 13% higher in 1995.124 The last year for which full financial data was available at
that time was 1994. In that year, Ontario's average published rate was $3.01, while
Quebec's was $2.75. But while the actual cost to Ontario employers was only $2.53,
Quebec's employers actually paid $2.79.125
But this comparison still overestimates Ontario's costs, due to differences in coverage
between the two systems. Only 70% of Ontario's workforce is covered by workers'
compensation as compared to 86% for Quebec. 126 Since average assessment rates are
weighted averages, 127 the exclusion from coverage of classes of employers with
relatively high payrolls but low assessment rates means that Ontario's costs are
overestimated relative to Quebec's. Some prime examples are the banking, insurance
and real estate sectors. The table on the next page lists industries which are mandatorily
covered under Qudbec's worker's compensation scheme, but only by application in
Ontario. It also lists the rates at which the payroll in these industries would have been
assessed in Ontario in 1994.128
Only three small industries (trapping, forest conservation and passenger water
transport) have assessment rates which would tend to cause Ontario's weighted
average rate to rise. The rest of the industries on this list would be assessed at rates
far below Ontario's average rate and have a combined payroll in the tens of billions
of dollars.
It must also be kept in mind that only 65% of Ontario's employers are covered under
Schedule 1 of the Act. The payrolls of industries covered under Schedule 2 of the Act
are not included in determining the average assessment rate, except to the extent that
individual employers apply to be transferred to Schedule 1. To the very large extent
that they do not, 129 Ontario's average assessment rate is further skewed, since these
also tend to be relatively high wage industries with relatively low assessment rates.
124. Ibid.,at8.
125. Based on net employer assessments as a percentage of insurable payroll. Quebec, Commission de la
sant6 et de la securitd du travail, Annual Report of Activities 1994 at 60-61.
126. Discussion Paper at 45.
127. See Section IV.A. above.
128. William M. Mercer Ltd., "Workers' Compensation Systems in Canada: Trends in Critical
Parameters", (March, 1995) at 25-27: Ontario Workers' Compensation Board, Employer Classifica-
tion Manual: Ontario Workers' Compensation Board, 1994 Assessment Rates Manual (28 January
1994).
129. In fact, some employers who applied for coverage under Schedule 1 long ago have been opting to
become self-insurers again. In 1994, 45 school boards with assessable payroll of about $2.5 billion
did exactly that. Since their payroll had been assessed at a rate of only 62€, this had an immediate ef-
fect on Ontario's standard average assessment rate. WCB Annual Report 1994 at 16.
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Trapping 181 3.99
Forest Conservation 190 4.72
Water Transport (Passenger) 580 4.93
TV/Radio Stations 983 0.68
Banks/Finance Industry/Insurance 956 0.20
Insurance/Realty Agencies 956 0.20
Accounting Offices 956 0.20
Lawyers 956 0.20
Management Consultants 958 0.39
Business Services 958 0.39
Colleges 812 0.45
Universities 817 0.45
Private Schools 810 0.62
Group Homes 858 0.85
Drug/Alcohol/Mental Counselling 875 0.58
Social Services (Non-Institutional) 875 0.58
Dental Offices 875 0.58
Physician Offices 875 0.58
Social Workers 875 0.58
Associations 981 0.59
Motion Picture Production 962 0.58
Clubs 944 1.85
Recreational Services 944 1.85
Barber/Hairdressing Shops 944 1.85
Funeral Services 944 1.85
Photographers 958 0.39
Travel Agencies 958 0.39
Membership Organizations 981 0.59
The following table lists industries which are included in the calculation of Qu6bec's
average rate, but are covered under Schedule 2 in Ontario. It also lists the rate group
and standard rates applied to the payroll of individual employers who transfer to
Schedule 1.130
130. Supra, note 128.
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Provincial Government 842 0.55
Municipalities 845 2.02
School Boards/Teachers 810 0.62
Libraries 817 0.45
Telephone Company 983 0.68
The dangers of facile comparisons between the average assessment rates of different
provinces should be obvious. In this particular case, it seems evident that assessment rates
in Ontario were actually lower than those in Quebec at the time Mr. Jackson was writing.
Given the variations in coverage and distribution of assessable payroll, the only fair
way to compare workers' compensation costs as a measure of competitiveness is to
compare the rates for similar industries. Such a comparison has been done in studies
released by the KPMG management consulting firm in March, 1995 and in 1996.131
At the request of the federal government, KPMG reviewed a number of benchmarks
of competitiveness for selected provinces and states as they relate to high tech, high
wage industries.
In the 1995 battle between Ontario and Quebec, the study found that workers'
compensation costs were lower in Ontario for four out of six industries, with one tie.
In the pharmaceuticals industry, the only case in which Qu6bec came out on top,
Ontario's "competitive disadvantage" in workers' compensation amounted to less than
2/10 of 1% of gross pay. By 1996, Ontario's rates were lower across the board.
Workers' Compensation as a Percentage of Gross Pay
Ontario & Quibec
132
Autoparts 4.92% 4.56% 5.51% 4.27%
Environmental Services 5.00% 5.00% 5.40% 3.60%
Food Processing 4.08% 4.00% 4.32% 3.82%
Medical Devices 1.34% 1.25% 5.13% 1.52%
Pharmaceuticals 1.50% 1.67% 1.35% 1.32%
Telecommunications 1.15% 1.00% 1.94% 0.88%
131. KPMG, A Comparison of Business Costs in Canada and the United States, (Vancouver: March,
1995); KPMG, The Competitive Alternative: Comparison of Business Costs in Canada and the
United States (1996).
132. Supra, 1995 edition at 24, 1996 edition at 19.
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B. Ontario vs. the United States
Although it is difficult to compare U.S. and Canadian assessment
rates, Ontario's average rate is estimated to be over 40 per cent
higher than the average rate in neighbouring Great Lakes states. 133
Hon. Cam Jackson
Whoever made these estimates for Mr. Jackson certainly did have difficulties with the
comparisons. Concluding that Ontario's assessment rates are over 40% higher than
those in neighbouring states requires one to make all of the possible mistakes can-
vassed above with respect to the interprovincial comparison and then some. Even the
slightest effort to deal with the confounding factors demonstrates that this could not
possibly be true, and that a fair comparison would show lower costs in Ontario than
in the U.S.134
It should come as no surprise, then, that the 1995 KMPG report mentioned above also
found that Ontario's rates tend to be lower than those of the six U.S. jurisdictions
studied, which include two Great Lakes states. Of the six industries in the comparison,
Ontario's workers' compensation costs were the lowest in four cases and second lowest
in two.
Workers' Compensation as a Percentage of Gross Pay
Ontario & U.S., 1995135
Autoparts 4.56% 6.84% 5.35% 9.38% 9.07% 5.04% 2.41%
Environmental Services 5.00% 22.00% 10.74% 18.73% 8.87% 9.43% 8.17%
Food Processing 4.00% 11.65% 6.22% 11.65% 14.90% 4.34% 6.95%
Medical Devices 1.25% 3.27% 3.16% 4.46% 2.97% 1.78% 1.52%
Pharmaceuticals 1.67% 5.41% 3.16% 4.20% 1.99% 0.79% 3.86%
Telecommunications 1.00% 5.86% 3.04% 4.44% 4.58% 1.45% 1.52%
133. Discussion Paper at 8.
134. See supra, note 79 at 25-27 for an attempt to compare Ontario's rates with U.S. rates generally. On
the difficulty of pinning down costs in the U.S., see J.F. Burton et al., "The Employers' Costs of
Workers' Compensation in the 1990s: The $100 Billion Gap" in 1998 Workers' Compensation Year
Book (Horsham, PA: LRP Publications, 1997) at 1-32. The "gap" refers to the different estimates of
employer costs reached by two traditional measures.
135. Supra, note 132, 1995 edition at 24.
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The 1996 comparison produced the same relative rankings for these six states and six
industries.
Workers' Compensation as a Percentage of Gross Pay
Ontario & U.S., 1996136
Inusr Ontairio~ TAX 014 NH I N N CA
Autoparts 4.27% 12.58% 6.94% 7.02% 9.07% 5.04% 2.41%
Environmental Services 3.60% 10.99% 7.97% 14.69% 8.87% 9.43% 8.17%
Food Processing 3.82% 11.55% 6.55% 9.28% 14.90% 4.34% 6.95%
Medical Devices 1.52% 3.72% 2.03% 7.28% 2.97% 1.78% 1.52%
Pharmaceuticals 1.32% 5.41% 2.90% 4.15% 1.99% 0.79% 3.86%
Telecommunications 0.88% 5.86% 2.93% 3.74% 4.58% 1.45% 1.52%
Ontario's competitive advantage in workers' compensation should come as no surprise
given the increased administrative costs of private for-profit systems, as well as the
private medical costs with which even monopoly state funds must contend. Clearly,
the competitiveness miracle in workers' compensation will be phony. When the time
comes, the government will likely have the competitiveness of Ontario's workers'
compensation costs confirmed by respected management consulting firms.
VI. REAL PROBLEMS REQUIRE THOUGHTFUL SOLUTIONS
The question, in my opinion, is not what other countries have done,
but what justice demands should be done. 137
Hon. Sir William Ralph Meredith
The tremendous attack on injured workers represented by Bill 99 cannot be justified
based on a situation of financial crisis at the Board or a lack of competitiveness with
other jurisdictions. The explanations provided above as to why this is the case also
reveal some of the strategies which will be at the government's disposal in manufac-
turing the phony miracle cure that is sure to follow the passage of the Bill 99 cutbacks.
Simply placing a positive spin on the situation and adopting a few perfectly sound
actuarial adjustments would go a long way toward a cure even without the Bill 99
cutbacks.
With the cutbacks, the present government and Board administration may well astound
even themselves with the rate at which the unfunded liability decreases. But this phony
financial miracle will leave behind real problems. In fact, the universally held opinion
of advocates for injured workers is that Bill 99 represents a quantum leap in the
136. Supra, note 132, 1996 edition at 19.
137. Ontario, Final Report on Laws Relating to the Liability of Employers, (Toronto, King's Printer,
1913) at 15 (Commissioner: The Hon. Sir William Ralph Meredith, C.J.O.).
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genuine crises related to health and safety in the workplace, and the mistreatment of
those who are injured through systemic discrimination, chronic unemployment and
gross undercompensation. 138 For those who suffer serious, permanent injuries, the
growing gap between de-indexed benefit payments and the rising cost of living will
result in a massive transfer of costs from employers onto injured workers, their
families and taxpayer-funded programs such as welfare.
But Bill 99 and the policies used by the Board to implement it represent more than a
cut in the level of benefits. 139 They also make the management of claims by employers
mandatory, increasing the likelihood and probably the intensity of the undesirable
behaviours initially encouraged by experience rating. More claims will be suppressed
and more injured workers with permanent disabilities will be offered short-term jobs
which are terminated after their benefits have been safely cut off. This will help to
ensure that Ontario's workplaces become safer on paper, while incentives for real
health and safety are reduced by making compensation cheaper and safety regulation
and enforcement more "flexible".
At the same time, in apparent contradiction to the miracles produced by the govern-
ment and the private sector in balance sheets and statistical compilations, the dissatis-
faction of injured workers with the Board will grow as benefits are reduced, job search
programs are denied to the unemployed and time limits for appeals are missed. No
doubt a number of former crisis lobbyists will promote privatization as a solution.
Eliminating the unfunded liability from the balance sheet also eliminates the primary
obstacle to an open market for private insurance companies and to the unchecked
growth of private rehabilitation services and claims management consultants. While
the government has done what was necessary to resolve the financial crisis, and
employers and workers have reduced accidents and the length of claims through
self-reliance, the storyline may well read, the Board bureaucracy is simply incapable
of providing decent service to its "customers". The only cure for the useful crisis
around "customer satisfaction" is full-blown privatization.
It is not clear whether the present or any future government would throw its weight
behind such a scheme. There are certainly counterbalancing pressures, including the
interest of employers in the price benefits that a non-profit, monopoly insurer provides.
138. For an overview of these problems, see Biggin et al., supra, note 5.
139. The role of policy should not be underestimated. One objection that government politicians or Board
bureaucrats could raise to the arguments in this paper is that Bill 99 also gives the Board the tools it
needs to deal with its "revenue leakage" problem. In this context, they might well point to s.146 of
the WSIA, which allows the Board to pursue successor employers for unpaid assessment debts. In
fact, they would probably have to point to this section, since the Board previously had the statutory
powers necessary to collect nearly all assessment debts, including the power to place liens on
employer property. Prior to Bill 99 the Board also had the power to maintain revenue neutrality in its
experience rating programs. What was lacking was not statutory powers, but the political will to use
them. In this connection, it is noteworthy that the provisional Bill 99 policies released by the Board
in January 1998 are entirely silent on issues of "revenue leakage". Ontario, Workplace Safety and In-
surance Board, Bill 99 Operational Policies (1 January 1998).
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While employer attitudes are likely to play the largest role in the foreseeable future,
one hopes that pressure from injured workers to do "what justice demands should be
done" will again become a force to be reckoned with. In formulating specific proposals
for reform, and particularly in addressing the problem of inadequate benefit levels and
indexation, care must be taken to ensure that they appear on the balance sheet in a way
that can withstand both serious scrutiny and public relations attacks by employers.
